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B O O K R E V I E W
Deception and Detection in Eighteenth-Century Britain. Jack Lynch. Bur-
lington, VT: Ashgate, 2008. Pp. xiii+218.
Jack Lynch, one of the true leaders of modern Johnson studies, has pro-
duced a very valuable contribution to current scholarship on the impor-
tant subject of deception and detection in the long eighteenth century. His
particular approach, focusing on underlying assumptions about fraud and
its debunking, is new, symptomatic of the period’s conception of reality,
and well grounded in current research and rare primary sources usefully
collected in his twenty-page bibliography. So fair-minded as sometimes to
resist taking sides in complicated controversies under his discerning scru-
tiny, Lynch offers a crisply written, well-organized, and comprehensive as-
sessment of the philosophy of criticism surrounding all the major—and
much minor—literary fakery roiling the English public of the time.
Two introductory discourses enunciate his emphasis on the cultural
forensics of imposture, specifically, the methods used to expose fakery,
the rhetoric of disproof, and the modes of argumentation for sifting facts
and assertions. Some of the primary reasons for the markedly increased
attention to deception in the age lay in the rise of a scientific epistemol-
ogy, a nascent historical criticism, a more sophisticated legal evaluation
of evidence and motive, a prevailing Lockean psychology, and an improv-
ing discipline of diplomatics for testing the physical authenticity of docu-
ments. Capping the opening remarks is a solid review of modern propo-
nents of fakers—‘‘the exculpatory school’’ of current critics (3)—for a
salutary reminder that the distinction between truth and falsehood, if at
times erased today in relativistic theoretical inquiry, was by no means a
meaningless opposition in the eighteenth century.
 2012 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. For permission to reuse, please contact
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Chapter 1 concentrates on perhaps the principal example of literary
forgery, James Macpherson’s publication of bogus English translations of
spurious ancient Gaelic poetry attributed to a Scottish bard, Ossian. The
complexity of the case is vividly illustrated in the accurate tracing of
Thomas Percy’s initially anti-Ossian stance, then his wavering about au-
thenticity, then his acceptance of Ossian, and finally his rejection of the im-
posture. The vagaries of Percy’s response highlight various ways of assessing
deception, such as popular affirmation, internal style, supposed examples
of sources, and ‘‘expert’’ testimony, none of which proved decisive. Mac-
pherson’s calculated vagueness about the ‘‘originals’’ behind his ‘‘transla-
tions,’’ whether orally transmitted or in manuscripts reaching back to the
third century, made detection extraordinarily difficult to establish. Even
Jack Lynch at one point seems reluctant to comment conclusively about
the matter from a sense of the theoretical impossibility of doing so: ‘‘I do
not pretend to have settled the Ossianic question; in fact, my thesis is that
we cannot settle it, at least not by imposing our own answers on the messy
realities of the dispute’’ (30). This is a modest inference, which, if consis-
tent with abstract philosophical considerations of modern reservations
about certitude, gives way to the author’s well-taken inclination to criti-
cize Macpherson’s ‘‘chicanery’’ (108) and ‘‘chimerical’’ historicism later
on in the book (180).
Having launched his powerful Ossianic illustration of the intricacies of
fraud, Jack Lynch proceeds to dissect, chapter by chapter, the variant
eighteenth-century methods of dealing with fakery, such as resorting to
ridicule, authorial credentials, the boasted greatness of a work, common-
sense norms, and appeals to universal human experience discussed in
chapter 2. Chapter 3 unfolds an acute analysis of a crucial evolution in
legal evidence, from positive demonstrations of certainty to circumstan-
tial presumptions of epistemic probability reflected increasingly in seven-
teenth-century English jurisprudence and systematized in Sir Geoffrey
Gilbert’s The Law of Evidence (1754). Epistemic probability was central to
empirical inductive intellection at the heart of the pervasive eighteenth-
century concern with deception. Chapters 4 and 5 detail internal and
external consistency as standards for detecting deception, which, if clear
enough to formulate, proved difficult to implement with uniform co-
gency. This is so for external consistency, ‘‘because every attempt to com-
pare a questionable account against the known world raises many episte-
mological problems’’ (99). The important point is made about the age’s
unprecedented ontological openness to new observation as opposed to
traditional authoritative testimony discredited by scientific investigation
and the acceptance of epistemic probability. And yet a major problem
arose in exposing imposture on this new basis: ‘‘At what point should a
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doubtful new claim be enough to overturn conventional wisdom?’’ (107).
There never would be any set rules for answering this question.
Chapter 6 is an especially enlightening examination of the age’s grow-
ing historicism, inherited from the Renaissance, feeding the search for
anachronism in Richard Bentley’s indictment of the pseudoclassical Epis-
tles of Phalaris, in Edmond Malone’s critique of William Henry Ireland’s
Shakespeare forgeries, and in analyses of forgeries by Macpherson and
Thomas Chatterton. Chapters 7 and 8 take into account the veracity of
testimony and documentary evidence and the myriad fascinating motiva-
tions for fraud, as interest in a single ruling passion yielded to a preoccu-
pation with complicated human psychology evident in legal inquiry and
contemporary novels. It should come as no surprise in a study on fakery
of such consistent excellence that the last chapter, ‘‘Different Kinds of
Value,’’ provides a splendid finale for the book. It begins by respectfully
noting open-ended postmodern conflations of truth and falsehood and
concedes that literary worth and authenticity are not always inseparable,
as in the case of Chatterton’s Rowley poems. But the difference in the two
considerations is not of degree but of kind, one consisting of aesthetic
judgments and the other defined by historical imperatives. If Jack Lynch
cautiously locates a pressing popular demand for authenticity over literary
value ‘‘at least in eighteenth-century culture,’’ he also happily affirms a pe-
rennial human relish for historical truthfulness in literature and life: ‘‘The
fact is, though, that most people do care about such matters, and have for a
long time’’ (174).
Just as the book commences with the Ossian controversy, so it con-
cludes with stirring reference to Macpherson’s downfall for violating his-
torical truth in opposition to Johnson’s most cherished principles as a
man, a moralist, and a literary critic: ‘‘Poets like Macpherson, though,
began to affirm [truthfulness], and therefore left themselves open to ac-
cusations that they lied. Insofar as the study of literature is a matter of
acquiring objective knowledge about the extra-literary world, it is subject to
the kinds of judgments about truth and falsehood that apply outside the lit-
erary arena, and forgers’ reputations have largely depended on the degree
to which they claimed to make objective claims about the real world’’
(180). Amen. Although, theoretically, it might seem impossible to prove
convincingly that something is a fake, ‘‘mindless skepticism is no healthier
than mindless credulity’’ (183). Samuel Johnson, so bracingly sound and
reassuring in his outlook on humanity, is, as Jack Lynch insists persuasively,
a man for all seasons in his fearless and thoroughgoing abhorrence of false-
hood in defense of truth, which makes knowledge, civilization, and our
survival possible: ‘‘Fakery reduces us to a state of perpetual doubt, and teach-
es us not to trust’’ (187). This well-fashioned and erudite book is highly
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recommended for all scholars, graduate students, undergraduates, and
lay readers interested in the insatiable human penchant for fabrication,
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